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I.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Industrial Commission Erred as a Matter of Law Because It Failed to Follow
the Appropriate Legal Standards for Deciding Causation.
1.

The Industrial Commission erred by deciding the case based on a
preponderance of the evidence rather than a reasonable degree of medical
probability.

Respondent argues that the Industrial Commission did not eIT in deciding the issue of
causation by a "preponderance of the evidence." Respondent's Brief at 3. However, he cites no
law to establish that the legal standard for causation is preponderance of the evidence. Instead,
he recognizes that the legal standard is "reasonable degree of medical probability." Id. (citing

Anderson v. Harper's Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006)).
There is a significant difference between preponderance of the evidence and reasonable
degree of medical probability. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard does not require
medical evidence. Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 327, 360 P.3d 333,
336 (2015) (not requiring medical evidence to establish by "a preponderance of the evidence that
the accident in which [the claimant] was injured (1) arose out of and (2) in the course of his
employment"). The "reasonable degree of medical probability" standard does require medical
evidence. Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 164, 997 P.2d 621, 625 (2000) (holding that
the Industrial Commission may not decide causation "without medical evidence").
The medical evidence required to establish causation within a reasonable degree of
medical probability is a medical opinion, by way of oral testimony or a written statement in
medical records. Id.;Anderson v. Harper's Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065
(2006). A claimant's testimony is not medical evidence and, thus, is not enough, standing alone,
to establish causation. Langley v. State of Idaho, 126 Idaho 781, 785, 890 P.2d 732, 736 (1995)
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(recognizing that an accident occurred based on the claimant's testimony but finding no medical
opinion establishing that the accident caused injury); Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761,
764, 605 P.2d 939, 942 (1980) ("[Claimant's] testimony does not constitute medical testimony
which is necessary to supp01i his claim for compensation."). The claimant must present a
credible medical opinion establishing a probability, not a possibility, of causation. Langley, 126
Idaho at 786, 890 P.2d at 737 (finding no evidence to support causation where doctors did not
offer opinions to a reasonable degree of medical probability, but instead only concluded that the
work environment may have ilTitated the claimants' asthma); Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., 124 Idaho
946, 947-48, 866 P.2d 969, 970-71 (1993)) (recognizing that causation is not established where a
doctor voices unce1iainty about the cause of injury and affirming the Industrial Commission's
decision to not give weight to the testimony of a doctor who voices uncertainty).
In this case, the Industrial Commission blatantly disregarded the proper standard for
finding causation by looking at the evidence as a whole to find causation based on a
preponderance of the evidence. Although the Industrial Commission is free to consider all of the
evidence presented, as discussed below, the Industrial Commission must find causation to a
reasonable degree of medical probability based on a medical expe1i opinion. Because the
Industrial Commission found causation based on a preponderance of the evidence rather than
within a reasonable degree of medical probability based on an expert opinion, the Industrial
Commission e1Ted.

2.

A medical opinion, not the totality of the evidence, is required to establish
causation.

To try and justify the Industrial Commission's decision, Respondent argues that the
Industrial Commission should be free to look at the totality of the evidence, including a
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claimant's testimony because a dete1mination of causation will depend on the claimant's
testimony. Respondent's Brief at 3-4. Once again, Respondent cites no law to support this
argument. Instead, he supports his argument with (a) an argument that medical opinions are
advisory only, and (b) an argument that requiring the Industrial Commission to rely on a medical
expert opinion raises the legal standard for causation. None of these arguments has merit.
Although it is true that the Industrial Commission is "not bound to accept the opinion of
any particular medical doctor," this does not negate that it must accept the opinion of a medical
doctor to find causation. Clarkv. Truss, 142 Idaho 404,408, 128 P.3d 941,945 (2006)
(affirming the Industrial Commission's finding that claimant did not have a pre-existing medical
opinion because it did not find the one medical opinion providing this opinion to be credible);
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the Industrial Commission "may not decide
causation without opinion evidence from a medical expert." Anderson v. Harper's Inc., 143
Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006) (emphasis added); see also Langley, 126 Idaho at
785-86, 890 P.2d at 736-37; Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., 124 Idaho 946, 947-48, 866 P.2d 969, 97071 (1993). To allow the Industrial Commission to decide causation without a medical opinion
would allow the Industrial Commission to play doctor as it has done in this case.
The requirement that the Industrial Commission rely upon a medical opinion does not
mean that the Industrial Commission is precluded from considering other evidence. See Estate

ofAikele v. City of Blaclifoot, 160 Idaho 903, 911, 382 P.3d 352, 360 (2016). Other evidence
may help the Industrial Commission deteimine the credibility of the testifying doctors and decide
what weight to give various opinions. Id. Weighing medical expert opinions and determining
which opinions are credible for the purpose of reaching a decision is the very task that the
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Industrial Commission is charged with performing. Id. at 912, 382 P.3d at 361. Accordingly,
"the Commission can certainly consider whether the expert's reasoning and methodology has
been sufficiently disclosed and whether or not the opinion takes into consideration all relevant
facts." Id. at 911, 382 P.3d at 360. The Industrial Commission oversteps its bounds when it
decides to reach a decision based on its own medical findings rather than a medical expert
opinion. Corgatelli v. Steel W, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,297,335 P.3d 1150, 1160 (2014); Mazzone

v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 756 (2013). This is exactly what the Industrial
Commission did in this case, it disregarded its task of weighing the expert opinions and instead
formed its own opinion.
Respondent argues that requiring the Industrial Commission to rely on one medical
opinion over another would raise the legal standard for causation from reasonable degree of
medical probability to reasonable degree of medical ce1iainty. Respondent's Brief at 5.
However, this argument lacks both logic and legal supp01i.
The logical fallacy of Respondent's argument is demonstrated by the holding in Estate of

Aikele. In that case, the issue was whether the claimant's lung cancer was caused by
occupational exposure such that it was an occupational disease. Estate ofAikele, 160 Idaho 903,
906-07, 382 P.3d 352, 355-56. There were three doctors who offered opinions. Id. Only one,
Dr. Dickson, offered an opinion for the claimant. Id. at 907, 382 P.3d at 356. The Industrial
Commission found the opinions of Dr. Zuckerman and Dr. Pfoertner more persuasive than
opinion of Dr. Dickson and concluded that the claimant had not met his burden of proving an
occupational disease within a reasonable degree of medical probability. Id. at 908,911,382 P.3d
at 357, 360. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision, finding substantial evidence for
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this conclusion where at most there was a possibility, not a probability that firefighting work
caused lung cancer. Id. at 911-12, 382 P.3d at 360-61. The scientific study that Dr. Zuckerman
relied upon showed that firefighters have no greater risk than the general population of getting
lung cancer. Id. at 907,382 P.3d at 356. Dr. Dickerson "did not provided specific evidence
detailing what substances or in what amounts [the claimant] encountered during the 'hundreds of
carcinogenic fires' he reference[d]." Id. at 913,382 P.3d at 362. The fact that the Industrial
Commission decided to follow the opinions of Dr. Zuckerman and Dr. Pfoertner did not change
the claimant's burden of proof from reasonable degree of medical probability to medical
certainty. Id. at 913-14, 382 P.3d at 362-63.
The Idaho Supreme Court case that Respondent cites in support of his argument simply
establishes that a claimant must prove causation with evidence of medical probability, not
medical certainty. Bowman v. Twin Falls Const. Co., 99 Idaho 312,318,581 P.2d 770, 776
(1978), overruled on other grounds by DeMain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging, 132 Idaho 782,
785, 979 P.2d 655, 658 (1999). There is no holding in Bowman, let alone suggestion, that if the
Industrial Commission were to rely on one medical opinion over another that this would
somehow improperly raise the standard to medical certainty. See id. (remanding for the
Industrial Commission to dete1mine the proportion of total disability to employment as opposed
to other causes).
In an attempt to establish that the standard would change if the Industrial Commission
were forced to rely on a medical opinion, Respondent cites the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment (6th ed. 2008) ("AMA Guides") for the proposition that physicians have a
different understanding of what is meant by medical probability. According to the AMA Guides,
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physicians purportedly understand "medical probability" to mean having a 95% likelihood.
However, Respondent offers no evidence that physicians practicing in Idaho between 2016 and
the present understand probability in this way. Nor does he present any evidence that the
medical expe1is in this case understand medical probability as meaning more than a 95%
likelihood. To the extent that the doctors in this case are familiar with the AMA Guides, which
they are since they provide irnpaiiment ratings based on the AMA Guides, then they understand
that in the legal context (i.e., for workers' compensation claims), probability means more than
50%. 1
Significantly, the common usage of the term "probability" aligns with the Idaho Supreme
Court's definition of this term. Since 1973, the Idaho Supreme Comi has defined "probability"
for the purpose of workers' compensation cases as meaning "when there is more evidence in
favor than against." Dean v. Dravo Corp., 95 Idaho 558,562,511 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1973),
abrogated on other grounds by Jones, 134 Idaho 160, 997 P.2d 621. Pursuant to
Dictionary.corn, "probable" means: (a) "likely to occur or prove true," (b) "having more
evidence for than against, or evidence that inclines the mind to belief but leaves some room for
doubt," and (c) "affording ground for belief." There is no evidence in the record that any of the
physicians in this case, including Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell, have a different understanding
of the term "probable" than its common usage.
1 Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner both utilize the AMA Guides as demonstrated by other Industrial
Commission decisions. See, e.g., Wacaster v. Arla Lott Trucking, Inc. et al., No. IC 2007028189, 2010 WL 3947990, at *8 (Idaho Ind. Corn. Sept. 14, 2010) (noting that Dr. Hajjar used
the AMA Guides, 6th ed., to offer an opinion on impairment); Cuevas v. Nederend Dairy, et al.,
No. IC 2007-035349, 2010 WL 1832573, at *15 (Idaho Ind. Corn. Feb. 12, 2010) (concluding
th
that Dr. Gussner "correctly applied the methodology set out in the AMA Guides," 6 ed.).
Dr. Cox used the 6th edition of the AMA Guides in this case to give Respondent an impairment
rating. Ex. 32 at 2006.
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Neve1iheless, assuming arguendo that Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, Dr. Cox,
Dr. Schwartsman, and Dr. Krafft understood medical probability to be more than 95% likely, this
only strengthens Appellants' position. These doctors offered opinions to a reasonable degree of
medical probability that the injection did not cause Respondent's groin pain. In other words,
they either think that it is more than 50% likely or more than 95% likely that the injection is not
the cause of the groin pain.
The issue on appeal is not whether a higher standard ought to be employed. (Nor do
Appellants ask this Court or the Industrial Commission to impose a higher standard of proof on
Respondent.) The issue is whether the Industrial Commission failed to follow the appropriate
standard of finding causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. As the Industrial
Commission clearly stated in its decision, it chose not to give weight to any one medical opinion.
Instead, it played doctor by chen-y picking statements from various doctors to support its opinion
that there is medical causation. See Appellants' Brief at 24-27. Not only do these chen-y-picked
statements not constitute a medical opinion of causation within a reasonable degree of medical
probability, they establish at most a possibility, not a medical probability, that the right-sided
injection at L3-4 caused left-sided groin pain. Id. at 12-15, 24-27. By failing to determine which
medical opinion was credible and should be given weight, the Industrial Commission failed to
follow the appropriate standard for deciding causation.

B.

The Record Is Void of Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support the
Industrial Commission's Finding of Causation.
Respondent argues that there is substantial and competent evidence to suppmi a finding

of causation based on opinions and observations of four treating physicians as found in medical
records. Respondent's Brief at 7. In making this argument, Respondent misconstrues what the
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medical records actually show-a lack of objective evidence of nerve damage-and what the
treating physicians wrote in their repmis regarding Respondent's groin pain. Respondent also
argues that objective evidence should not be required to establish causation because it would
raise the standard of proof for causation. However, requiring medical opinions to be supported
by objective evidence is consistent with requiring something more than a possibility.
Respondent first rep01ied his groin pain to Dr. Hajjar, a neurosurgeon. Ex. 25 at
1606-07. In February 2015, Dr. Hajjar felt that Respondent's "burning pain in the upper [left]
thigh and hip" was ''probably consistent with an L3 issue" but recommended additional testing.
Id. at 1605 (emphasis added). By June 2015, after performing surgery at the L3-4 level and

obtaining two negative nerve conduction studies, Dr. Hajjar concluded that Respondent's groin
pain was not nerve related. Id. at 1623. Importantly, he reached this decision long before the
2017 MRI that showed iliopsoas bursitis, contrary to the assertions of Respondent and the
Industrial Commission. Compare id. at 1623 with Respondent's Brief at 9 (citing R. 110 at
~

65). At no point during his treatment of Respondent did Dr. Hajjar offer an opinion that the

left-sided groin pain was caused by the right-sided injection at L3-4. See generally Ex. 25.
Based on Dr. Krafft's examination, he felt that Respondent's pain was muscle related. Id. at
1623-24, 1628, 1630-31. When Dr. Hajjar was provided an oppmiunity to review additional
medical records a couple of years later in 2017, Dr. Hajjar concluded that the most likely cause
of the groin pain was iliopsoas bursitis. Id. at 1632-33.
Next, Respondent repmied his groin pain to Dr. Schwartsman, an 01ihopedic surgeon
who performed Respondent's left-hip replacement a year before the underlying industrial
accident in this case. Ex. 22 at 666, 669. Dr. Schwartsman initially felt that Respondent had
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left-sided radiculopathy down L3-4. Id. at 669-70. Several months later, after Respondent's
back surgery, Dr. Schwartsman concluded that the source of the pain was not Respondent's hip
and was likely "L3-4 nerve root initation" on the left side. Id. at 671. Notably,
Dr. Schwartsman did not offer an opinion that the source of the pain was from a right-sided
injection, which as Dr. Gussner pointed out, was not close to the L3-4 nerve roots. See id.;
Gussner Tr. 22:1-6. Also, Dr. Schwmisman, who is not a back doctor, mistakenly thought that
Respondent's decompression was only on the right. In reality, the L3-4 decompression was on
the right and the left. Ex. 25 at 1611. When Dr. Schwartsman was later provided with additional
medical records for Mr. Tenny, he changed his opinion and concluded that the most likely cause
of Respondent's pain was iliopsoas bursitis. Ex. 22 at 676-77.
At the recommendation of Dr. Schwartsman, Respondent went to Dr. Frizzell, a
neurosurgeon, in October 2015. Ex. 22 at 671; Ex. 29 at 1738. Dr. Frizzell concluded that
Respondent's pain may be due to peripheral nerves. Ex. 29 at 1738. He did not offer an opinion
on the cause of the possible nerve pain at that time. See id. Rather, it was not until almost three
years later, in September 2018, that he offered an opinion on causation. Ex. 29 at 1748. He
wrote that the left-sided lower extremity pain was caused by the "January 2015 epidural injection
at L3-L4 on the left side." Id. (emphasis added). However, Respondent's injection on January 8,
2015, was on the right side, not the left! Ex. 35 2042, 2056-58. On cross-examination,
Dr. Frizzell admitted that the only basis for his opinion was the temporal onset of pain. Frizzell
Tr. 33:23 - 34:5. He was unable to identify objective evidence to supp01i his opinion. Id. 23:1321, 33:5-8.
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Respondent then went to Dr. Thompson, an anesthesiologist specializing in pain
management. Thompson Tr. 5:10-12, 18-21. Dr. Thompson boasts that she "can, generally,
without objective testing data, know exactly what's wrong," based on her experience. Thompson
Tr. 23:9-13. She admittedly does not give a lot of weight to test results and did not give any
weight to the fact that Respondent had negative nerve conduction studies. Id 12: 17-25, 28:23
29: 13. She claims she can know the source of pain by Respondent's description, despite the fact
that pain reports are highly subjective. Id 28:23 -29:13; Gussner Tr. 37:9-15. She further
claims that she can know that Respondent's symptoms were caused by nerve pain based on his
reaction to opioid pain medication. Thompson Tr. 14:24- 15:5. However, Dr. Thompson
admittedly uses opioid pain medication to treat other types of pain. Id. 19:3-8. Also, she ignored
Respondent's use of marijuana for two years and does not know whether the marijuana could
have negatively impacted his pain complaints because, notwithstanding the fact that prescribing
opiates is a large part of her practice, she is not reading medical literature regarding marijuana
and its interplay with opiate medication. See Appellants' Brief at 21; Thompson Tr. 39:23 40:3. Dr. Thompson ultimately concluded that Respondent has nerve pain from his injection, but
she failed to identify any objective evidence to support this opinion. 28:20 - 29:9. She is really
relying on nothing more than the reported temporal onset of pain.
Nothing in the medical records or physician testimony shows an objective basis for a
finding that the right-sided injection caused the left-sided groin pain. Rather, the records show
objective evidence to the contrary: an injection at the L3-4 level that was not near a nerve root,
three negative nerve conduction studies, spot pain in the groin as opposed to pain distributed
over a region, no improvement in the groin pain following a decompression surgery, no sign of
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muscle weakness or muscle loss after three years, reported symptoms outside of a nerve
distribution, and an alternate diagnosis attributed to the pain. Ex. 27 at 1641-51; Ex. 32 at 2015;
Ex. 34 at 2034-35; Ex. 35 at 2056-58; Gussner Tr. 21 :1 - 22:6, 26:5-21; Hajjar Tr. 15:20-16:7,
20:3-17; Cox. Tr. 10:8-11, 11 :4-5. Further, physiologically speaking it "would be hard to hmi
the left side from a right sided injection if you tried to." Hajjar Tr. at 22:20-21.
To require some objective evidence to supp01i a finding of causation is not requiring
medical certainty. Rather, it is requiring something more than a possibility. An alleged temporal
onset of pain gives rise to a possibility, not a medical probability. Something more than a
possibility is required. That something more is lacking in this case. Although Respondent
offered the opinions of Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell to support his claim, those opinions are
nothing more than unsubstantiated conjecture. They are not substantial and competent evidence
to support a finding that the right-sided injection caused the left-sided groin pain.
The lack of objective evidence to support Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell's opinions
explains why the Industrial Commission pulled discrete statements by other medical providers in
an attempt to support the ultimate finding of causation. The Industrial Commission needed
something to support its opinion, and it took great libe1iy in utilizing isolated statements by
Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner even though the actual opinions by those providers is that the rightsided injection did not cause the left-sided groin pain. Those isolated opinions, which explain a
possibility, not a probability, do not constitute substantial and competent evidence to supp01i a
finding of causation.

- 11 49508.0010.13511343.2

C.

The Industrial Commission Did Not Err in Finding that Dr. Thompson Did Not
Review Medical Records Prior to Forming Her Opinion.

Respondent takes issue with the Industrial Commission's finding that Dr. Thompson did
not review medical documentation prior to reaching her conclusion that "something happened"
during the injection. Respondent's Brief at 11 (citing R. 108 ,r 58). Respondent does not state
why he raised this issue. If Respondent wants the Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's
finding on that issue, Respondent is seeking affirmative relief, which would require a crossappeal. I.A.R. 15(a). However, Respondent did not file a cross-appeal, thereby failing to
properly raise the issue for the Court to consider. Alternatively, if Respondent is not seeking
affirmative relief, then the Court can simply ignore the issue because Respondent is not asking
for relief.
Assuming arguendo that this issue is properly before the Comi, the Industrial
Commission's finding as to what Dr. Thompson reviewed is supported by the record and
illustrates why Dr. Thompson's opinion is not credible or worthy of any weight. When
Dr. Thompson first started treating Respondent at the end of 2015, she quickly concluded that
Respondent's symptoms were nerve related despite "no clear underlying objective testing to
suppmi the diagnosis." Ex. 30 at 1768. She also believed Respondent's representation that the
groin pain staiied at the time of the injection. Id. at 1754, 1779. Her medical records and
testimony do not provide evidence that she reviewed medical records from other treating
providers such as Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Krafft, or Dr. Gussner prior to reaching her conclusion that
Respondent had nerve pain from the injection. See id. at 1754-79. During her deposition, she
was not able to affirmatively state that she had received or reviewed those medical records.
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Thompson Tr. 26: 13 - 27 :23. She acknowledged that she had not seen Respondent's Diagnostic
Block Sheet in 2016. Thompson Tr. 27:16-23.
Even if Dr. Thompson had reviewed medical documentation prior to reaching her opinion
in December 2015 that Respondent had nerve damage, this does not change the fact that her
opinion is not supported by objective evidence. In other words, a different finding by the
Industrial Commission as to what information Dr. Thompson considered would not remedy the
problem with her opinion-that it is based solely on the temporal onset of pain. There is no
anatomical or physiological findings in the medical records that Dr. Thompson could have
reviewed that supports a conclusion of left-sided groin pain as a result of a right-sided injection.
Consequently, Dr. Thompson's opinion does not constitute substantial and competent evidence
to support the Industrial Commission's decision regardless of whether she reviewed medical
documentation.

D.

Respondent Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees.
Respondent argues that he is entitled to an award of attorney fees because Appellants do

not have a reasonable basis for the appeal. Respondent's Brief at 11. According to Respondent,
the appeal is without reasonable basis because Appellants are allegedly asking the Court to do
nothing other than reweigh the evidence. This argument is without merit.
In order for this Court to award attorney fees, it must find that Appellants contested
Respondent's claim for compensation without reasonable ground. IDAHO CODE§ 72-804.
Where there is reasonable ground for an appeal, Respondent is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees. Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting & Bodyworks, 128 Idaho 747,754,918 P.2d
1192, 1199 (1996) (declining to award attorney fees). Reasonable grounds for an appeal exist
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when the Industrial Commission fails to follow the proper legal standard for reaching a decision.

Aguilar v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 164 Idaho 893, 899, 436 P.3d 1242, 1248 (2019).
In this case, reasonable grounds exist for the appeal because the Industrial Commission
reached a finding of causation using the wrong legal standard-using preponderance of the
evidence rather than reasonable degree of medical probability based on a medical opinion. Also,
the Industrial Commission admittedly chose not to decide what weight to give the expert
opinions, and thereby failed to perform the task assigned to it. Considering the Indush'ial
Commission did not even weigh the medical expe1t opinions as required, there is not a finding
based on the appropriate legal standard for the Comt to reweigh. As to the evidence upon which
the Industrial Commission based its decision, it is not substantial and competent evidence to
suppo1t the decision, thereby resulting in an err upon which the decision must be reversed.
For these reasons, Respondent's request for attorney fees should be denied.

II.

CONCLUSION

Because there is a lack of substantial and competent evidence to support the Industrial
Commission's decision, Appellants request the Comt reverse the decision of the Industrial
Commission. In the alternative, Appellants request the Court vacate the decision and remand for
a decision that follows appropriate legal standards.
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